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This paper discusses how different concepts of rhythm apply to phenomenological psychological research. We
suggest that viewing phenomenological research in psychology as rhythmic not just enables us to notice how the 
research procedure implies certain shifts within in a series of temporally structured movements of repetition and 
change; it also enables us to deepen our understanding of the manner in which the researcher engages with the 
studied phenomenon through intuition. In other words, we argue that rhythm is fundamental to the method of how 
we understand “the things themselves.”  
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Introduction 
On a Wednesday in October 2020, Ii visited the Danish art museum Glyptoteket 
to conduct interviews for a psychological study on the experience of beauty. In 
my research, beauty experiences are investigated empirically through 
descriptions of museum visitors’ experiences with visual art. 
On this particular afternoon, I wander through the half-empty museum 
halls, searching for possible interviewees. I stop as a painting catches my eye. 
It is as though this particular painting shines, exceeding the limits of its 
frame. With suddenness, my mind leaves walls, sculptures, and other paintings
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behind. In this moment, it is as though the painting is in charge while I 
obediently listen. No specific thought on the configuration of the painting 
announces itself, but waves of emotion move through me. It is like a force flowing 
from my toes and to my chest, a force appearing with such a conviction, such an 
energetic sense of contentment and pleasure that I immediately feel certain: 
This can only be an experience of beauty. 
Astonished by this sudden occurrence of beauty, my heart still racing from the 
experience, I return to my search for interviewees. In a secluded exhibit room, a 
museum visitor agrees to participate in an interview. As the conversation gradually 
discloses his experience with an artwork, I no longer think of the painting. Yet, 
having just encountered beauty, I listen to the interviewee’s words with a 
compelling bodily sense of knowing how to listen for its reverberations. 
The process repeats for the rest of the afternoon. Each time an interviewee describes 
an experience, my experience of the painting reoccurs, not in its original form but 
with variations. Nevertheless, something similar shines forth, and the bodily 
sensations return, thus pulling together parts of the experiences described by 
interviewees and the experience I had earlier that afternoon. In between interviews, 
I return to the painting, and each time, a sense of reappearance of the phenomenon 
of beauty occurs as if my body were reminded of its radiant manner of announcing 
itself.ii 
These reflections from the field serve to hint at two distinctive ways in which 
phenomenological psychological research may be interpreted as rhythmic. Firstly, the research 
process described illustrates how phenomenological psychological researchers, such as those 
who employ Amedeo Giorgi’s method (2009) might work within repetitive patterns of data 
collection. Secondly, as illustrated here, rhythmicity of phenomenological psychological 
research consists of an intuitive manner of being involved with a phenomenon by attuning to 
the subject matter without aiming at controlling it. This intuitive continuous return to the 
phenomenon constitutes the rhythmicity of phenomenological methods in psychology by 
flowing through and thus uniting different parts of the investigative process.  
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Part one: Phenomenology and rhythm 
The phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty proposes that rhythm is fundamental to being. 
In this paper, we suggest that rhythm is just as fundamental to the investigations of being that 
are carried out by phenomenological psychologists. Through reflections on rhythm, the paper 
thus aims at extrapolating a conception of phenomenological methods in psychology that is 
aligned with human experience. This perspective is not in opposition to established ideas within 
phenomenological methods in psychology; rather, it aims to highlight established ideas by 
identifying an inherent rhythm within these. 
In the early 20th century, the philosopher Edmund Husserl created the theoretical basis 
for phenomenology, which, decades later, inspired psychologists such as Amedeo Giorgi to 
design methods that strive to listen attentively to how the world shows itself in experience. We 
suggest considering this very act of listening as a matter of attending rhythmically to the 
appearance of phenomena. Thus, this paper aims to show how basic phenomenological 
principles employed in psychological research may be understood as inherently rhythmic.  
The starting point for this paper is to apply a concept of rhythm to principles of 
phenomenological methods in psychology in order to shed light on oscillatory shifts inherent 
to the method. In this regard, we discuss how rhythm may be inherent to Husserlian principles 
and to the research procedures of Giorgi’s Descriptive Phenomenological Method in 
Psychology (2009). There are other methods within the field, but we consider, with 
phenomenological psychologist Frederick Wertz, this to be the foundational one for 
psychology, since other methods appear as later variations of this (Wertz, in press). 
This paper’s initial reflections from the field display how a rhythmical form involves a 
series of components that are repeated and thus structured in time. However, as the sections 
below will show, without a gathering force running through such series of components, actual 
rhythm will be missing from the structure. In this paper’s reflections on method in 
phenomenological psychology, we identify intuition as this gathering force. The bodily 
engagement of intuition is itself an act of attunement to the rhythms of the phenomenon. 
Through the employment of intuition, the phenomenological psychological researcher grasps 
the rhythmical existence of the studied phenomenon by listening to it with sensitivity, by being 
grasped by it, by letting it be.  
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Rhythms of the world 
If we view phenomenology as “an account of ‘lived’ time, of ‘lived’ space, of the ‘lived’ world” 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2012, p. xxi), perhaps rhythm—understood as movements in time—in 
a sense resides at the very heart of phenomenology. At one point in Phenomenology of 
Perception, Merleau-Ponty proposes:  
My life is made up of rhythms that do not have their reason in what I have chosen 
to be, but have their condition in the banal milieu that surrounds me. A margin of 
almost impersonal existence thus appears around our personal existence. (Merleau-
Ponty, 1945/2012, p. 86) 
This margin of impersonal existence, Merleau-Ponty explains, is defined by our anonymous 
bodies, which refer to a general and pre-personal level of existence. Rhythms, according to 
Merleau-Ponty, spring from the way the anonymous body thrusts forward in life while adhering 
to the general form of the worldly milieu. In Merleau-Ponty scholar Galen A. Johnson’s words, 
these worldly rhythms are to be found within this forward-thrusting movement; this pre-
conceptual, pre-reflective momentum of existence is “the forward thrust of life that is 
rhythmically paced” (Johnson, 2010, p. 199).iii  
Similar to Merleau-Ponty, the sociologist Henri Lefebvre operates with an idea of 
rhythm as fundamental to being. Stressing what he takes to be a wide-ranging relevance of 
rhythm, he states, “Everywhere where there is interaction between a place, a time and an 
expenditure of energy, there is rhythm” (Lefebvre, 1992/2004, p. 15). In his writings on what 
he titles “rhythmanalysis”, he develops a transdisciplinary approach to grasping relationships 
between the multiple internal and external rhythms that he argues are constitutive of any 
worldly living or non-living being. In line with what Merleau-Ponty proposes in the quote 
above, Lefebvre (1992/2004) suggests that we think of rhythm as a defining feature of existence 
that functions prior to knowledge hereof. 
Lefebvre’s method of rhythmanalysis is not committed to phenomenology. In 
Rhythmanalysis—space, time and everyday life, Lefebvre distances his work from parts of the 
phenomenological tradition and criticizes phenomenology for neglecting how rhythms 
characterize existence. Nevertheless, contemporary scholars have associated Lefebvre’s work 
with phenomenology (Crespi & Manghani, 2020; Kinkaid, 2020; Schmid, 2008). He shares 
with Merleau-Ponty the ambition to create an account of space, time and “the lived” that 
challenges the Cartesian world view (Lefebvre, 1974/1991).  
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If the world is made up of rhythms, the question that follows is: How are we to acquire 
an understanding of the features of this rhythmicity? Rhythm, Lefebvre states, is something 
that “enters into the lived; though that does not mean it enters into the known” (1992/2004, p. 
77). Rhythms become epistemologically accessible only through rhythmanalysis; processes of 
analysis of space and time, and of “the lived” which Lefebvre regards as a philosophical term 
for everydayness (Lefebvre, 1965/2016).  
The everyday or “le quotidian” which means “the mundane life” of ordinary people 
signifies the simple temporal pattern of repetition characteristic of what happens every day. 
Thus, according to Lefebvre, rhythms are, by nature, constituted by repetition. But an “absolute 
repetition” in which “A=A” is only “a fiction of logical and mathematical thought” since “the 
second A differs from the first by the fact that it is second” (Lefebvre, 1992/2004, p. 7). As the 
quote argues, rhythmic repetition is not mechanical or rigid, and it does not exclude the organic 
occurrence of differences. Repetition, according to Lefebvre, produces differences. Studying 
the center of Paris from his open window, Lefebvre (1992/2004) takes notice of the city’s 
recurring peak hours, the daily stream of people from the outskirts entering the city to do their 
shopping, the tourists visiting the same places; all interrupted by the night, which then again is 
interrupted by the morning’s noisy traffic and piercing sounds of children on their way to 
school. Watching and listening to all of this, he notices the repetitions and the diversity 
characterizing the polyrhythmic field in which everyday life plays out.  
We recognize the rhythmic for its repetitive structure, but, importantly, Lefebvre’s 
(1992/2004) rhythmanalysis is a process that takes more than applying a pre-defined rhythmic 
structure to a phenomenon. Rhythmanalysis, rather, is a matter of listening that requires an 
attentive ear and a willingness to let go of the desire to possess that which is listened to. 
Lefebvre states: “In order to grasp and analyse rhythms, it is necessary to get outside them, but 
not completely … To grasp a rhythm is necessarily to have been grasped by it: one must let 
oneself go, give oneself over, abandon oneself to its duration” (1992/2004, p. 27). Thus, 
knowing or capturing rhythm is to be captured by its organically developing movements.  
Rhythms of the body 
To Lefebvre, the body serves the rhythmanalyst as a metronome: “He draws on his breathing, 
the circulation of his blood, the beatings of his heart and the delivery of his speech as landmarks 
… He thinks with his body, not in the abstract, but in the lived temporality” (Lefebvre, 
1992/2004, p. 21). The analytic capturing of rhythms of the world happens, not just from the 
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place of, but by means of the rhythmical body. Embedded in a world of rhythms, humans are, 
as rhythmical bodily beings, continuously affecting and affected by rhythms of the world. 
Attending to the external rhythms of the world means finding ways of adjusting the relationship 
between internal rhythms and external rhythms. When synchronicity of polyrhythmic relations 
occurs, what begins as a manifold of rhythms becomes an integrated and comprehensible 
totality resulting in what Lefebvre calls isorhythmia. Isorhythmic relationships are rare, he 
states, but can be identified in certain co-creative dynamics, for instance, in the relationship 
between a conductor and an orchestra. Isorhythmia implies that separate rhythms interact in 
ways enabling them to reach equivalence regarding rhythm’s features such as measure, 
repetition, and change, which is what the rhythmanalyst, from the position of her rhythmical 
body, sets out to achieve. 
In line with Merleau-Ponty (1945/2012), Lefebvre’s (1992/2004) rhythmanalysis is 
attentive to the practical and theoretical relevance of the body. However, it appears that 
Lefebvre’s understanding of the body mainly attends to rhythms of internal bodily functions. 
Except for briefly declaring that acts of movement (“gestes”) is a rhythmical matter, he does 
not consider what the features of bodily movements can reveal about rhythm itself. 
While Merleau-Ponty (1945/2012) has placed great emphasis on movement as an aspect 
of being, the connection between rhythm and bodily movement is subtle and somewhat 
concealed within the prose of his language. Within the field of phenomenological philosophy, 
such connection has been made more explicitly by Maxine Sheets-Johnstone (2015), who 
examines the concept of rhythm in an investigation of the phenomenology of dance. As a 
prototype of rhythmical movement, dance serves as a key illustration of how the phenomenon 
of rhythm is constituted. In line with Finlay (2008), who has described the phenomenological 
psychological attitude as “a dance between the reduction and reflexivity” containing “sharp 
shifts of focus and rhythm” (p.3), rhythm in dance is a concept that captures important aspects 
of the method of interest.  
To understand the rhythm of dance, Sheets-Johnstone (2015) distinguishes between a) 
rhythmic structure and b) dynamic line (p. 90). A rhythmic structure is a reduction of 
movements in time to a series of individual components (e.g., the sequence of steps in a 
choreography). There is a “static temporality” to such an understanding of rhythm in which 
“each instant is apprehended as a separate unit” (Sheets-Johnstone, 2015, p. 13). In contrast, 
the dynamic line, which is a phenomenological concept of rhythm, implies that the moments 
of a rhythmical structure have an internal relationship. Sheets-Johnstone (2015) provides 
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several examples. Here is one: If an arm is abducted and then adducted immediately after, the 
completion of the initial abductive movement is simultaneously a preparation for the adductive 
movement that follows. The dynamic line, and thus rhythm, implies that the line of movements 
is not illogical or arbitrary; it follows “the guiding thread in the development of a form” 
(Sheets-Johnstone, 2015, p. 83). There is, Sheets-Johnstone proposes, a projectional force 
relating the first movement to the second. The projectional and tensional qualities of each 
movement affect the temporal flow, which is what makes the line lively, vibrant, dynamic. In 
dance, there is no actual line understood as a static or rigid architecture of action but rather a 
perpetual projection of force (Sheets-Johnstone, 2015).  
Sheets-Johnstone stresses that while awareness of a given rhythmic structure can work 
as a tool with a possible practical application (e.g., knowing the order of the steps of a dance), 
actual dance, and thus actual rhythm, is only brought to existence if the "mere series of 
movements becomes a dynamic flow of force" (Sheets-Johnstone, 2015, p. 89). Dance and thus 
rhythm, she explains, does imply a rhythmic structure that reveals particular tempi and 
particular accents. In other words, knowing a rhythmic structure means to be aware of the 
specific series of moments implied in a specific rhythm. However, on an experiential level, 
rhythm does not exist as a series of moments but as a continuous flow. Rhythm, as lived, is “a 
perpetually moving form, a unity of succession, whose moments cannot be measured,” … 
“whose ‘moments’ are all of a piece” (Sheets-Johnstone, 2015, p. 16). Importantly, Sheets-
Johnstone does not make this distinction between rhythmic structure and dynamic line in order 
to simply replace the first with the latter or to remove a concept of rhythmic structure from our 
understanding of bodily movements in dance. Rather, what she suggests is a reconsideration of 
the very idea of rhythm as the mere structure of individual movements or mere moments in 
space and time and a consideration of the dynamic line that gives union and flow to rhythmic 
phenomena. 
Waves and rivers 
According to the French structuralist Émile Benveniste (1971), the Greek term “rhuthmos”, 
“ῥυθµός”, derives from “ῥεῖ”, which means “to flow.” Within the field of comparative 
grammar, it has continuously been suggested that we understand the connection between 
rhythm and flow by the intermediary metaphor of the movements of the waves of the sea 
(Benveniste, 1971). However, one may ask, as Benveniste (1971) did in an etymological 
analysis of the notion of rhythm: Isn’t this association inaccurate, impossible even, since what 
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flows is not the waves but rather the stream of the river? The flowing stream of the river, 
Benveniste declares, simply does not have rhythm in the sense that the regular pulsating 
movements of waves do.  
Lefebvre (1992/2004) recognizes this apparent contradiction while asking his reader to 
observe the waves of the Mediterranean Sea closely. Waves move rhythmically toward the 
shore in the sense that the same monotonous episodes repeat themselves. Waves move with a 
measurable regularity, and as something that is defined by measure, they seem to be governed 
by something like a law. They move in a manner that is calculated and expected as if they were 
obeying an obligation or carrying out a project (Lefebvre, 1992/2004, p. 8). Understanding 
rhythm’s measure through a metaphor of waves, he emphasizes rhythm’s repetitive and 
therefore somewhat predictable nature. However, Lefebvre (1992/2004) also draws in 
expressions such as stream, current, perpetual flows, and finally, the phenomenon of time when 
discussing features of rhythmicity. Like Merleau-Ponty, Lefebvre was highly inspired by 
Marcel Proust’s novel In Search of Lost Time (Elden, 2004). Reflecting on the phenomenon of 
time, which, at first glance, “seems to escape measure on account of its fluidity” (Lefebvre, 
1992/2004, p. 10), he unifies these only apparently oppositional conceptions of rhythm. While 
the waves seem measured, looking carefully at each wave approaching the shore will reveal 
their spontaneous, ceaselessly changing, and interrelated nature. Correspondingly, while time 
appears fluid, time flow is as quantifiable and therefore as measurable as anything else. That 
which flows and that which comes and goes in motions of waves can be viewed as cyclical, 
predictable, and measurable, yet both may also be understood as linear and spontaneously 
unfurling. Rhythm is the structured repetitive movement and the flowing force carrying 
forward its elements.  
In accordance with Sheets-Johnstone (2015), the concept of rhythm that Lefebvre 
(1992/2004) proposes is twofold: First, a rhythm is a series of moments, or in Lefebvre’s 
account, elements. Second, similar to what Sheets-Johnstone (2015) calls a “force of the 
dynamic line”, Lefebvre (1992/2004) identifies in each rhythm an extensive energy capable of 
“taking with it” each rhythmic element. While the rhythmic structure consists of repetitive, 
somehow predictable movements like those of the waves, the dynamic line is rhythmic in the 
sense of a flowing force, perhaps analogous to the metaphor of the stream of a river or the 
progression of a poem.iv Thus, both stress that although a rhythm necessitates a series of 
moments or elements, it fundamentally relies on a structuring, interrelating flow of force.  
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A related understanding of rhythm can be identified in the phenomenologist Jessica 
Wiskus’ (2013) interpretation of Merleau-Ponty in regards to rhythm. She quotes Merleau-
Ponty:  
We are experiences, that is, thoughts that feel behind themselves the weight of the 
space, the time, the very Being they think, and which therefore do not hold under 
their gaze a serial space and time, nor the idea of series, but have above themselves 
a space and a time that exist by piling up. (Merleau-Ponty, 1964/1968, p. 115) 
Being is defined not just by “a serial space and time, nor the idea of series” but by “space and 
time that exists by piling up.” This perpetual piling up means that elements in time are not 
individual but rather, as Merleau-Ponty continues, “nodes and antinodes of the same 
ontological vibration” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964/1968, p. 115). Interpreting Merleau-Ponty, 
Wiskus asks, “This ontological vibration, this movement of depth: what is it but rhythm? 
(Wiskus, 2013, p. 37). The “piling up” of space and time interconnects each of its moments, 
not by comprising a series, but through rhythmical, perpetual vibration. It seems that grasping 
rhythm consists not merely of uncovering a series of movements but recognizing the way we 
are already moving along with phenomena within the rhythmical worldly milieu.   
The question then is: What happens if this twofold understanding of rhythm is applied 
to the context of phenomenological research in psychology? Returning to the field note that 
introduced this paper, the process may be understood in terms of its rhythmical structure, which 
would reduce the process to a series of steps following upon each other. The structure of the 
process is repetitive; the phenomenon of beauty appears and reappears throughout the process. 
Interviews and encounters with the painting interchangeably occur in an apparently ordered 
series of events by means of which the process obtains a pattern. Lefebvre (1992/2004) would 
characterize this pattern as the measure of the process. But these somewhat measured 
movements also imply a constant variability within the perpetual flow of the research process, 
a flow in which multifaceted and unsettling cognitive, emotional, and bodily processes in a 
polyrhythmic field become what they are in relation to each other. Analogous to Sheet-
Johnstone’s (2015) point that a rhythmic structure in itself does not provide us with an 
understanding of the nature of dance, awareness of the rhythmic structure of a research process, 
stepwise and repetitive, fails to reveal anything about the interaction between the steps or the 
source of energy that flows through them and interconnects them. Further, if we employ 
Lefebvre’s (1992/2004) notion of isorhythmia, the rhythmicity of the research process can be 
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understood as bodily and emotional attunement to the rhythms of the phenomenon. Listening 
to the silent presence of the phenomenon as it shows itself in the encounter with the painting 
and in the interviewee’s descriptions can be understood as a yielding towards an isorhythmic 
relation between the researcher and the phenomenon. Applying Lefebvre’s Rhythmanalysis 
(1992/2004) to phenomenological psychological methods thus encourages us to notice how the 
very appearance of phenomena may be understood in terms of rhythms.  
Part two: Rhythms of method in phenomenological psychology 
Various approaches exist within the field of phenomenological psychology.v This analysis 
begins by consulting two central principles as they were originally formulated by Husserl: the 
concepts of phenomenological reflection and intuition. However, rather than examining 
Husserl’s complex system of concepts in depth, to highlight the psychological perspective of 
this paper, this section will examine The Descriptive Phenomenological Method by Giorgi 
(2009), a method directed explicitly at research in psychology. By means of these two 
perspectives, this section reflects on how the understandings of rhythm described above may 
be analogous to certain basic principles within this phenomenological psychological method. 
The first part of this section aims to show that an aspect of what appears as rhythmic 
within Husserl’s principles is the researcher’s ever-changing manner of evaluating the available 
data or possible knowledge of the phenomenon under investigation. The researcher 
interchangeably enters a position of reflective uncertainty and a position of knowingvi through 
intuition. We return to the question of how the different concepts of rhythm sketched out in the 
above apply to this oscillatory movement between positions. First, let us consider what can be 
referred to as uncertainty of scientific research practice. Uncertainty can be understood as that 
which makes us question possibly misleading theoretical, methodological, and personal beliefs. 
Thus, in any qualitative investigation, we somehow rely on our ability to feel uncertain. As 
producers of knowledge, researchers ought to welcome a sense of uncertainty and hesitate with 
regard to the assumption that their conclusions truly reflect the world. Uncertainty is essential 
to the discipline of scientific conduct because it reflects a sensitivity to the complexity and 
possible ambiguities of the studied phenomenon. But what does such uncertainty amount to 
within phenomenological methodology? In an often-quoted paragraph, Husserl states that the 
philosopher must begin in “absolute poverty, with an absolute lack of knowledge” (Husserl, 
1960, § 1).vii Within phenomenological methodology, starting with a lack of knowledge means 
attempting to set aside assumptions regarding the phenomenon, that is, beginning an 
investigation with an attitude of uncertainty regarding the psychological meaning of the 
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phenomenon. More specifically, the idea of uncertainty as a necessary scientific principle is 
embedded within the fundamental phenomenological act of “bracketing” (Husserl, 1913/2012). 
In this act, one “disconnects” from that which, based on theoretical abstractions or past 
experience, is assumed to be true of the phenomenon of interest. This act is applied to our 
hypotheses or theories about the phenomenon of interest and the fundamental assumptions one 
might have about the constitution of worldly phenomena. In the context of this paper, the point 
is that by means of this act, one attempts to disconnect from a sense of knowing and enter into 
a sphere of uncertainty. Husserl expresses the radicalism of the act:  
The whole world as placed within the nature-setting and presented in experience as 
real, taken completely “free from all theory”, just as it is in reality experienced, and 
made clearly manifest in and through the linkings of our experiences, has now no 
validity for us, it must be set in brackets, untested indeed but also uncontested. 
(Husserl, 1913/2012, § 32). 
This lack of validation of fundamental assumptions ultimately implies an inactivation of all 
judgments that have, up until this very moment, been regarded as knowledge. In 
the disconnection-aiming act of bracketing, a fundamental shift happens. Our thesis of 
the phenomenon undergoes a sort of transformation that Husserl calls a 
“transvaluing” (Husserl, 1913/2012, p. 58). The shift occurring in this act of “transvaluing” is 
not a transformation in the sense that we reject what is assumed, nor in the sense that former 
theories about phenomena are replaced with novel ones, but in the sense that what was known 
is now held in suspension.viii 
Such an act of reflection, of “transvaluing”, of questioning, needs to be understood in 
relation to the type of act that enables the researcher to obtain a sense of knowing. With 
regards to this type of act, Husserl’s “principle of all principles” guides us in the direction 
of what presents itself to intuition. What presents itself to intuition, Husserl states, is 
“simply to be accepted as it gives itself to be” (Husserl, 1913/2012, § 24).Within the 
context of this paper, Husserl’s original account thus calls our attention to two important 
acts: 1) the reflective questioning of assumptions and 2) the employment of 
intuition. Following Husserl, phenomenological researchers are confronted with the need to 
find ways to balance these acts. How can we question what we assume to be true and yet trust 
our intuition with regard to what is given? And, if both these acts serve important functions in 
phenomenological inquiries, how should researchers deal with the dynamics of their 
seemingly oppositional nature?  
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In this paper’s search for an answer to these questions, yet another question arises: Is it 
possible that what appears to be acts-in-conflict is more accurately understood if viewed as acts 
complementing each other in a rhythmically organized structure? Applying what Sheets-
Johnstone (2015) and Lefebvre (1992/2004) have both pointed out as inherent to rhythm, 
phenomenological acts of reflection and intuition can be understood as a structured series of 
varying and repetitive elements. Phenomenological inquiries, then, are like the pulsating 
movements of waves, varying yet somehow regulated and somewhat repeating themselves. 
Yet, what is lacking in this understanding of phenomenological research as rhythmic is what 
Sheets-Johnstone (2015) calls the “dynamic line” of rhythm; the perpetual projection of force 
which in Lefebvre’s (1992/2004) vocabulary “takes with it” all the elements. What is missing 
in this understanding is, in other words, a common source of energy that interconnects each 
element of the series, the overall force flowing through and uniting the movements. At first 
glance, it seems as if there is no common force governing the position of uncertainty through 
reflection and of knowing through intuition. It seems as if they are two conflicting forces 
pulling the researcher in opposite directions.  
Let us briefly return to Husserl’s “principle of all principles” for guidance with regard 
to identifying this missing rhythmical force within phenomenological methodology. If we 
envision a practical application of this principle, phenomenological intuition seems to be about 
creating an authentic relationship with the phenomenon of interest in which the researcher 
attunes to the phenomenon. What if the “acceptance” of phenomena as they “present 
themselves to intuition” and “give themselves to be” (Husserl, 1913/2012, § 24) is understood 
not just as an element in a series of positional shifts and repetitions but as the energetic force 
uniting and thus carrying forward the movements of research? This interpretation of rhythm 
within Husserlian principles will guide the following reading of Giorgi’s (2009, 2017) modified 
Husserlian approach.  
Based on an extensive reading of Husserl’s phenomenology, Giorgi developed a 
method that aims at applying phenomenological principles to qualitative psychological 
research. Giorgi’s Descriptive Phenomenological Method in Psychology (2009, 2017) is not a 
data-gathering method. Rather, it is an analysis method designed to identify psychological 
meanings within descriptions of experience. To psychological researchers studying 
consciousness, meeting scientific criteria such as the requirement that “measurement processes 
have to be applied to the data” (Giorgi, 2009, p. 3) is a challenging task that prompts Giorgi to 
raise questions such as: “How does one analyze a description of a concrete experience in a 
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psychologically meaningful way and achieve at least the same degree of objectivity that 
quantitative analyses reaches?” (Giorgi, 2009, p. 121). Consequently, Giorgi describes a 
phenomenological research method that comprises a series of steps providing this type of 
research with a systematism and a transparency that does not compromise the aim for a rigorous 
understanding of the data.  
In the first of three stepsix, the researcher reads the experience description to obtain “a 
general sense of what the description is about” (Giorgi, 2009, p. 128) from within the attitude 
of the scientific phenomenological reductionx. Secondly, the researcher rereads the interview 
and breaks the description into what Giorgi calls “meaning units” (Giorgi, 2009, p. 129). 
Dividing the descriptions into a series of smaller parts helps the researcher by “making the 
descriptions manageable” (Giorgi, 2009, p. 130). In the third step, each meaning unit is 
“transformed by the researcher” into “psychologically pertinent expressions” (Giorgi, 2009, p. 
137). Within this step, Giorgi requests that the researcher “once again goes back to the 
beginning of the description” to interrogate each meaning unit, and finally repeat this process 
“until all of the meaning units have been transformed” (Giorgi, 2009, p. 133).  
This structured analysis process provides the data with manageability by means of 
repetition. Within the descriptions of each of the steps, Giorgi (2009) suggests overcoming 
various challenges through processes of repetition and returns: “One goes back to the beginning 
of the description and begins to reread it” (p. 129), “once again goes back to the beginning of 
the description” (p. 131), “goes back to the data” (p. 133), “reread the description” (p. 130). 
Not just within each analysis but on a more general level, the process is structured by repetition: 
He recommends that “invariant meanings should be repeated in subsequent research” (p. 131) 
and that the entire process is repeated to achieve general structures through “data from several 
individuals” (p. 131).  
By repeating specific acts and by continuously returning to the data, this series of steps, 
of movements, achieves a circularity providing it with what we may view as analogous to what 
Sheets-Johnstone (2015) calls rhythmical structure. These repetitive steps resemble steps of a 
“dance of research.” One moves around the phenomenon in a pre-structured manner that 
repeats itself like the movements of the waves cyclically progressing toward and pulling back 
from the shore.  
In part one of this paper, reflections on possible defining features of rhythm also 
displayed how Lefebvre (1992/2004), in line with Sheets-Johnstone (2015), operates with a 
twofold understanding of rhythm, in which one level is concerned with rhythm’s structure. 
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Within such structures, repetition is a key feature in the sense that repetition provides the series 
of elements with a measure that divides the whole into smaller parts (Lefebvre, 1992/2004). 
The application of measure by means of repetition seems to arrange Giorgi’s (2009) method in 
a rhythmical form.  
However, reading Lefebvre (1992/2004) and Sheets-Johnstone (2015) along with 
Merleau-Ponty (1964/1968, 1945/2012) made it clear that, for rhythm to arise, a series of 
elements must be somehow connected and thus flowingly carried forward by a uniting 
perpetual force. The description of the steps of Giorgi’s (2009) method does not directly state 
what binds the steps together, what provides the guiding thread, what allows for unity within 
the procedure. But reviewing the descriptions of the steps more closely reveals that each action 
of the steps relies highly on intuition. The meaning unit division, for instance, is not only 
concerned with shifts in meaning, and although the process of reading the interview works in 
a pre-structured, repetitive way, the process is far from mechanical. As Giorgi puts it, the 
process is a “spontaneous activity” that “has a certain arbitrariness to it” (2009, p. 130). 
Likewise, when transforming the units of meaning, it may occur that “an important implicit 
psychological meaning is not stated anywhere, but it has a strong background presence” 
(Giorgi, 2009, p. 134), in which case the researcher’s descriptions rely not solely on carrying 
out a pre-given action but also on her intuitive sense of a presence of psychological meaning. 
This intuitive sense runs through the research process as a guiding thread.  
Thus, within Giorgi’s method, phenomenological analysis has to rely on not just a pre-
structured series of shifting and repetitive actions but as well on a willingness to “dwell with 
the data” (p. 131), and on the “psychological sensitivity the researcher brings to the task” (p. 
130). Carrying out the steps may be understood as the rhythmic structure of the method, but 
intuition seems to be what Sheets-Johnstone (2015) would label the “perpetual projection of 
force” that makes a rhythmic structure truly rhythmic.  
Finally, Giorgi (2009) emphasizes that carrying out this analysis procedure requires the 
adoption of an “intersubjective attitude” (p. 133) and “a sensitivity toward the phenomenon 
being researched” (p. 137). Without explicating its meaning, the notion of sensitivity is used 
numerous times in the account and seems to be a guiding thread in the progression of the 
method. Considering this along with Lefebvre (1992/2004) suggests an understanding of this 
method as essentially constituted as rhythmic not just by being a series of pre-given steps but 
by means of an attunement to phenomena. The process of the steps moves forward, not 
according to a manual, but according to how the phenomenon manifests itself as intuitions. 
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Thus, intuition seems to be the perpetually flowing force providing the repetitive structure of 
phenomenological psychological inquiries with a sense of rhythmicity. 
Part three: Rhythm of phenomenological intuition 
In The Visible and the Invisible, Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1964/1968) devotes an essay to 
discussing different understandings of intuition. With a critical eye, he examines the notion of 
intuition posited by Husserl and Henri Bergson, respectively. What Husserl claims to be 
intuition is, to Merleau-Ponty (1964/1968), trapped in an epistemology that assumes a 
hypothetical and disengaged “pure spectator” capturing the “essences of the world” from a 
distant place, while to Merleau-Ponty, essences show up primordially, that is, in bodily 
engagement with the worldly “flesh.” The flesh is the fabric of being through which all sensible 
beings are interconnected. Because of this kinship, embodied human beings and worldly 
objects “encroach” upon each other or even “overlap” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964/1968, p. 248). 
Aiming at an account of intuition that situates humans in this worldly fabric, he states:  
Under the solidity of the essence, and of the idea, there is the fabric of experience, the 
flesh of time … The visible can thus fill me and occupy me only because I who see it 
do not see it from the depths of nothingness, but from the midst of itself. (Merleau-
Ponty, 1964/1968, p. 113) 
This “midst,” our field of experience, is an environment we cannot exit; there is no other 
environment for us to enter, no “ontological void” or environment of nothingness from where 
we can grasp the world in a pure manner.  
By opposing a view of intuition posited by Bergson, details of which we will not outline 
here, Merleau-Ponty (1964/1968) enriches his account on intuition by stating that intuitive 
givenness of things is not accessed by “coinciding with” or “fusing with” things. If we were to 
grasp a thing through fusing with it, becoming unity, the thing itself would vanish. Philosophy 
is, Merleau-Ponty says, “a manner of letting the things themselves speak” (1964/1968, p. 125), 
while the view of intuition that Merleau-Ponty here opposes results in the “silence of things” 
(1964/1968, p. 127). As it appears in The Visible and the Invisible, intuition is a distant yet 
attentive way of being present, not just with things but specifically with the universe of 
appearances that things seem to produce.  
Through this critique of two distinct views of intuition resulting in viewing things either 
by a “soaring over or as fusion,” from an “infinite distance” or by “absolute proximity” 
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(1964/1968, p. 127), Merleau-Ponty arrives at a somewhat ambiguous place in between. 
Although the distant “pure spectator” remains a hypothesis that cannot be attained, it is true, 
he states, that “every being presents itself at a distance, but this does not prevent us from 
knowing it” (1964/1968, p. 127). On the contrary, distance is what keeps us from merging with 
other beings in ways that annul their being, their thingness as thing. There is, he writes, a 
“thickness of flesh between us and the ‘hard core’ of Being” (1964/1968, p. 127). 
Merleau-Ponty rejects the possibility that intuition means to detect the essence of things 
from an infinite distance, but the alternative that he provides also operates with a notion of 
distance. As he suggests, “We should have to return to this idea of proximity through distance, 
of intuition as auscultation or palpation in depth” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964/1968, p. 128). Let us 
consider the medical metaphors employed here. In medical procedures of palpation, the 
examined body’s inner condition is known through a touch of the body’s outside, the skin. 
Similarly, in procedures of auscultation, the inner condition of the body is known through the 
sound released from the inside to the outside, where the examiner is listening with a 
stethoscope. Through touch or listening, the examiner obtains knowledge of characteristics of 
the inside of the examined. For example, low density inside the examined body part may 
produce a hollow sound. If intuition, as Merleau-Ponty (1964/1968) here suggests, is an 
indirect yet insightful examination in depth, it means that we as examiners of the world rely 
heavily on the sensibility of our perceptory apparatus and a sensitivity that allows us to “listen” 
at a distance.  
Lefebvre’s Rhythmanalysis does not explicitly employ a notion of intuition, nor does it 
operate with an ontology of “flesh”, and yet it seems to arrive at an understanding of intuition 
somewhat similar to Merleau-Ponty’s account in The Visible and the Invisible. Merleau-Ponty 
(1964/1968) and Lefebvre (1992/2004) share an idea of proximity as a necessary component 
of intuition: What Lefebvre calls isorhythmia is found within a proximal relationship between 
what makes the noise and he who listens, rhythmic phenomena and the rhythmanalyst, 
orchestra and the conductor, painting and the spectator. As highlighted earlier, the 
rhythmanalyst strives to listen attentively to the world. Listening is inherent to Lefebvre’s mode 
of inquiry: “He will come to listen to a house, a street, a town, as an audience listens to a 
symphony” (Lefebvre, 1992/2004, p. 22). But in line with Merleau-Ponty, the rhythmanalyst 
listens at a distance: “In order to grasp and analyse rhythms, it is necessary to get outside them, 
but not completely” (Lefebvre, 1992/2004, p. 27). Like Merleau-Ponty (1964/1968), Lefebvre 
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uses the metaphor of auscultation to illustrate this. By listening attentively but maintaining a 
distance, rhythms of the world become detectable.  
Considering Lefebvre (1992/2004) and Sheets-Johnstone (2015) led to a common 
understanding of rhythm as dependent on a flowing force of energy connecting a series of 
moments or elements. Applying this understanding of rhythm to phenomenological methods 
in psychology suggested that intuition is the uniting force of such inquiries. Merleau-Ponty’s 
(1964/1968) understanding of intuition read along with Lefebvre (1992/2004) suggests how 
such intuition, as the uniting principle of phenomenological methods in psychology, consists 
in an attentive yet distant modus of listening common to the rhythmanalyst and the 
phenomenological psychologist.  
If intuition in phenomenological inquiries is understood as “a manner of letting the 
things themselves speak” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964/1968, p. 125), and if grasping a rhythm is “to 
have been grasped by it”, to “let oneself go, give oneself over, abandon oneself to its duration” 
(Lefebvre, 1992/2004, p. 27), then listening is a matter of balancing the interest in the 
phenomenon with the being of the phenomenon itself. The worldly beings which the 
philosopher desires to know, Merleau-Ponty writes: 
offer themselves therefore only to someone who wishes not to have them … but to 
let them be and to witness their continued being—to someone who therefore limits 
himself to giving them the hollow, the free space they ask in return, the resonance 
they require, who follow their own movement. (Merleau-Ponty, 1964/1968, p. 101) 
The phenomenological psychologist following Merleau-Ponty, it seems, shares with the 
rhythmanalyst the intention of giving the phenomena “the resonance they require” and of 
“following their movement.” But most importantly, they both strive to listen intuitively and 
sensitively to the phenomena by letting them be. The philosopher Kym Maclaren (2002) and 
the cognitive phenomenological researcher Hanne de Jaegher (2019) both emphasize in this 
quote by Merleau-Ponty the specific expression of “letting be.” As de Jaegher (2019) points 
out, acts of letting be hold a tension between moving close to and staying distant from the 
phenomenon of interest. With this balancing act, we aim at, on the one hand, not to break the 
phenomenon down by projecting our intentions onto it and on the other hand, not engaging so 
much that we end up being determined by it. The epistemology that the notion of “letting be” 
implies has a softness to it in the sense that the type of knowledge it involves is sensitive to and 
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continuously moldable by encounters with the phenomenon itself. The expression of “letting 
be” emphasizes this sensitivity, humility, and absence of control with which the phenomena of 
interest are listened to. 
These acts of letting be are at the heart of phenomenological methods in psychology. 
In Descriptive Phenomenological Methods in Psychology, Giorgi defines what he calls 
“the attitude of description” as “one that only responds to what can be accounted for 
in the description itself” (Giorgi, 2009, p. 127). Distinct from methods that embrace 
interpretation, construction, or explanation, the method of description in 
phenomenological method in psychology requires great caution with regard to any 
“nongiven factors” such as assumptions, hypotheses, and theories (Giorgi, 2009). 
Phenomenological psychological descriptions are merely “satisfied with the given, it dares 
not go beyond what is present” (Giorgi, 2009, p. 127). When one uses description as a means 
of analyzing phenomena as they are given in experience, phenomena remain fairly intact, 
because the descriptive method intuitively and sensitively listens to phenomena in the sense 
that it lets the phenomena be.
The importance of intuition in psychological science
What does the concept of rhythm bring in relation to phenomenological methods 
in psychology? As we have shown, reflecting on the method as rhythmic points toward 
intuition as a pivotal element of phenomenological psychology. In Psychology as a Human 
Science, Giorgi’s (1970) historical analysis shows how psychology tends to adopt the 
objectivist attitude of the natural sciences. This attitude implies the assumption that the 
world can be grasped independently of human mind. Viewed from this “naïve realist” 
position, the term “subjective” used in relation to science can only be pejorative since it 
indicates that the particular method is unsuccessful in making a sharp distinction between 
objects of the world on the one hand and affects, thoughts, judgements etc. of human mind on 
the other (Giorgi, 1970, p. 113). However, as Giorgi points out, even the notion “objective” 
indicates that the researcher is oriented toward an object, that is, toward something other than 
herself, which makes “objectivist” research an activity of intentionality (1970, p. 116). The 
field of what Giorgi refers to as “human science” generally acknowledges the inevitable 
presence of the researcher-subject in the process of research but as Giorgi stresses, it is 
crucial that such embeddedness of subjectivity in the research situation is not just 
recognized theoretically, but explicitly and concretely dealt with within methodological 
practice. In the context of this paper, this may be interpreted as an encouragement for
B. Kudahl & T. Roald: Rhythms of intuition. Methodological reflections in phenomenological psychology. 128
Qualitative Studies: 6(2), pp. 110-131 © 2021
128 
scholars within the field of phenomenological psychology to provide detailed descriptions of 
how their research makes use of intuition. This paper’s reflections on rhythm of 
psychological phenomenological method underline an active and explicit use of intuition 
as a way of specifying how psychology as a human science transparently employs rather 
than avoids subjectivity.  
Conclusion 
If rhythms are movements in time, space, and everyday life, then rhythmicity is not a 
structure that the researcher strives for but something that always already is present. 
Through rhythm, we have attempted to show that intuition is a principle, a modus, a 
sensitivity with which we return to the “things themselves”—return to the phenomena in the 
research process. The entire descriptive research process is about arriving at the phenomenon 
through intuition. We listen and attune sensitively and repeatedly to the phenomenon, 
describe and understand it through proximity and distance. Although the method is separated 
out into a variety of steps, intuitions about the phenomenon flow through the process of 
analysis and unites these steps beyond measure. Rhythms are central to the research 
process as we listen to phenomena that are essential rhythms of the world.  
References 
Benveniste, E. (1971). Problems in general linguistics. Coral Gables, Fla: University of Miami Press. 
Crespi, P., & Manghani, S. (2020). A Genealogy of Rhythm. In P. Crespi & S. Manghani (Eds.), 
Rhythm and Critique: Technics, Modalities, Practices (pp. 30–52). Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press.  
De Jaegher, H. (2019). Loving and knowing: Reflections for an engaged epistemology.
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-019-09634-5 
Elden, S. (2004). Rhythmanalysis: An Introduction. In H. Lefebvre (Ed.). Rhythmanalysis: Space, 
time, and everyday life (pp. 1-9). London ; New York: Continuum. 
Finlay, L. (2008). A Dance Between the Reduction and Reflexivity: Explicating the 
“Phenomenological Psychological Attitude.” Journal of Phenomenological Psychology, 
39(1), pp. 1–32. https://doi.org/10.1163/156916208X311601 
Giorgi, A. (2009). The descriptive phenomenological method in psychology: A modified Husserlian
approach. Pittsburgh, Pa: Duquesne University Press 
Giorgi, A. (1970). Psychology as a Human Science. A Phenomenologically Based Approach. New 
York ; Evanston ; London: Harper & Row Publishers. 
129    B. Kudahl & T. Roald: Rhythms of intuition. Methodological reflections in phenomenological psychology. 
Qualitative Studies: 6(2), pp. 110-131   ©2021 
129 
Giorgi, A., Giorgi, B., & Morley, J. (2017). The Descriptive Phenomenological Psychological 
Method. In C. Willig & W. Stainton-Rogers (Eds.). The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research 
in Psychology (pp. 176-192) Sage.  
Halling, S. (2010). Truth and the rhythm of phenomenological research. In T. F. Cloonan & C. 
Thiboutot (Eds.). The redirection of psychology: essays in honor of Amedeo P. Giorgi 
(pp. 171–198). Montréal: Cercle Interdisiplinaire de recherches phénoménologiques, 
Déptartment de psychologie, Université du Québec à Montréal. 
Husserl, E. (1960). Cartesian meditations: An introduction to phenomenology (D. Cairns, Trans.). 
The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 
Husserl, E. (2012). Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology (W. R. B. Gibson, Trans.)
[Taylor and Francis Ebook]. Routledge. 
https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203120330. (Original work published 1913) 
Johnson, G. A. (2010). The retrieval of the beautiful: Thinking through Merleau-Ponty’s aesthetics. 
Evanston, Ill: Northwestern University Press. 
Kinkaid, E. (2020). Re-encountering Lefebvre: Toward a critical phenomenology of social space. 
Environment and Planning D: Society & Space, 38(1), 167–186. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0263775819854765 
Lefebvre, H. (2004). Rhythmanalysis: Space, time, and everyday life (S. Elden & G. Moore, Trans.).
New York: Continuum. (Original work published 1992) 
Lefebvre, H. (2016). Metaphilosophy (Fernbach, D. Trans.). London ; New York: Verso Books.
(Original work published 1965) 
Lefebvre, H. (1991). The production of space (Nicholson-Smith, D., Trans.). Oxford: Blackwell. 
(Original work published 1974) 
Levin, K., Roald, T., & Funch, B. S. (2019). Visual Art and the Rhythm of Experience. The Journal
of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 77(3), 281–293. https://doi.org/10.1111/jaac.12647 
Maclaren, K. (2002). Intercorporeality, Intersubjectivity and the Problem of “Letting Others Be.”
Chiasmi International, 4, 187–208. https://doi.org/10.5840/chiasmi2002431 
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1968). The visible and the invisible: Followed by working notes (Lingis, A.,
Trans.). Evanston: Northwestern University Press. (Original work published 1964) 
Merleau-Ponty, M. (2012). Phenomenology of perception (D. A. Landers, Trans.). Abingdon, Oxon ; 
New York: Routledge. (Original work published 1945) 
Schmid, C. (2008). Henri Lefebvre's Theory of the Production of Space: Towards a Three-
Diemnsional Dialectic. In K. Goonewardena, S. Kipfer, R. Milgrom, & C. Schmid 
(Eds.) Space, Difference, Everyday Life (pp. 41–59). New York: Routledge. https://
doi.org/10.4324/9780203933213-9 
B. Kudahl & T. Roald: Rhythms of intuition. Methodological reflections in phenomenological psychology. 130
Qualitative Studies: 6(2), pp. 110-131 © 2021
130 
Sheets-Johnstone, M. (2015). The phenomenology of dance. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 
Wertz, F. J. (in press). Phenomenological methodology, methods, and procedures for      
research in psychology. In H. Cooper (Ed.-in-Chief), M. Coutanche, L. M. McMullen, A. T. 
Panter, D. Rindskopf, & K. Sher (Eds.), APA handbook of research methods in psychology 
(2nd ed.): Vol. 2. Research designs: Quantitative, qualitative, neuropsychological, and 
biological. American Psychological Association. 
Wiskus, J. (2013). The rhythm of thought: Art, literature, and music after Merleau-Ponty. Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press. 
Notes 
i The “I” of the field note is the primary author of this paper. 
ii The inclusion of this first person experience is not an expression of a favoring of the method of introspection 
or of the viewpoint that psychological phenomenological research requires the researcher to have had 
experiences with the investigated phenomenon. For example, a researcher might study the experience of 
psychosis without ever having had a psychotic episode.  
iii Similarly, as Levin, Roald, and Funch (2019) demonstrate, phenomenological thought fosters an 
understanding of rhythm as a “pre-individual force” that “explains the becoming or the perceptual unfolding of 
subjectivity” (p. 291). In their analysis of how visual art experience may be conceptualized as rhythmic, they 
suggest that the concept of rhythm characterizes the process of emergence of the artwork to the subject. What 
makes this process rhythmic, they propose, is not “the extended rhythm of a subject in front of an object” but 
rather “a rhythmic co-presence of the work of art and subjective sensibility” (p. 292). 
iv As suggested here, perhaps rhythm as flow is more accurately understood if one considers the vital energy that 
carries forward the stream of words in a poem. As Johnson (2010) points out, rhythm’s Latin equivalent and 
graphic variant rhyme reminds us that rhythm resides within the sphere of poetry. The poetic connotation may 
hint at an understanding of rhythm beyond the regular repetitive pattern of movements that we recognize in the 
waves. 
v Among other approaches not included in this paper are the Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) 
approach and the microphenomenological approach. We choose not to review IPA because it is considered 
hermeneutic rather than descriptive/Husserlian while the microphenomenological approach is mostly concerned 
with cognition rather than psychological research in a broader sense. 
vi As Halling (2010) advocates, phenomenological researchers in psychology are obliged to aim for knowledge, 
or truths: “However problematic it may be, the notion of truth is indispensable to our work” (p. 131). In line 
with what this paper suggests, Halling develops an understanding of truths as embodied and rhythmical.  
vii Although the “neo-cartesian” writings of Husserl have received heavy criticism, the radical uncertainty that 
this quote illustrates is, nevertheless, one of the foundational descriptions that have inspired the definitions of 
key principles within contemporary methodological approaches such as Giorgi’s (2009). 
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viii Within the field of phenomenological psychological methods, consensus has not been reached with regard 
to what exact part the act of “bracketing” should play within research procedures. However, according to 
Giorgi (2009), bracketing refers to our handling of “past knowledge,” that is, knowledge of the phenomenon 
that we have acquired in the past rather than in the present encounter. Giorgi writes, “It is not a matter of 
forgetting the past; bracketing means that we should not let our past knowledge be engaged while we are 
determining the mode and content of the present experience” (2009, p. 92). In the act of bracketing, the 
phenomenological psychological researcher following Giorgi positions herself as uncertain with regard to the 
possible knowledge at hand deriving from past experience.  
ix In a newer but briefer description of The Descriptive Phenomenological Method, Giorgi et al., 2017 have 
described the same method but divided it into five steps. The general content of the method has not changed. x 
Giorgi et al. (2017) specify the attitude as follows: “this special attitude shift involves the epoché, which 
means to set aside all knowledge not being directly presented to consciousness, and then to consider what is 
given not as actually existing but merely as something present to consciousness” (p. 180) 
About the Authors 
Benedikte Kudahl is a PhD student at the Center for Phenomenological Psychology and 
Aesthetics, Department of Psychology, University of Copenhagen. Her PhD is a qualitative 
and theoretical investigation of the psychology of beauty experience. Besides the experience
of beauty, she is interested in phenomenological methodology and aesthetics in relation to
child development.  
Tone Roald is an Associate Professor at the Department of Psychology at the University of 
Copenhagen and the director of the Center for Phenomenological Psychology and 
Aesthetics. Her research interests center around aesthetics and phenomenological 
psychology, with the goal of clarifying how art creates meaning for us. 
Acknowledgments
This work was generously supported by the Carlsberg Foundation. 
Thank you to Charlotte Wegener for supporting the writing process and to the anonymous 
reviewer for providing vital feedback. 
